Gadzama SAN Case: How Justice Egwuatu Redefined Fair Hearing in Landmark Ruling

What happens when a lawyer is punished but has no effective avenue to appeal? Justice Egwuatu’s ruling in the Gadzama SAN case has opened a new chapter in Nigeria’s fair-hearing jurisprudence.

The case of Joe-Kyari Gadzama, SAN v. Body of Benchers & Ors. has raised a significant constitutional question: does fair hearing mean only the opportunity to defend oneself at first instance, or does it also require a practical and effective avenue to challenge an adverse decision?

Before the recent decision of the Federal High Court, Abuja, presided over by Hon. Justice Obiora Egwuatu, I was personally concerned about the peculiar predicament in which Joe-Kyari Gadzama, SAN, found himself. The three-year suspension imposed on him by the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (LPDC) appeared capable of running its full course without an effective appellate remedy, arising from a gap in the statutory framework which was no fault of the Applicant.

The consequences of depriving a legal practitioner of the right to practise, even temporarily, are grave, both constitutionally and reputationally. In many jurisdictions, considerable safeguards attend the suspension or revocation of a lawyer’s licence.
When it became apparent that there was no functioning statutory appellate mechanism, I was concerned for JK Gadzama, SAN, one of the giants of the Nigerian Bar. When he subsequently approached the Federal High Court seeking judicial intervention, I honestly thought that a preliminary objection from the Body of Benchers would bring the application to an end. How wrong I was.

The recent decision of Justice Egwuatu in Joe-Kyari Gadzama, SAN v. Body of Benchers & Ors., Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/1954/2026, delivered on 28 September 2026, deserves considerable attention for the important constitutional question it raises and for what may well be a new dimension in the jurisprudence of fair hearing in Nigeria.

The facts of the case is that the Applicant, a Senior Advocate of Nigeria, had been subjected to disciplinary proceedings before the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (LPDC) arising from a complaint of professional misconduct(he was alleged to have poached and took away the brief of a colleague which was considered wrongful). He participated in the proceedings and defended himself. At the conclusion, the LPDC issued a Direction dated 29 July 2026, which included a three-year suspension from legal practice.

That was the beginning of the troubles of the Applicant. The difficulty arose from the state of the law governing appeals from the LPDC. In Ben Mene-Ejegi v. Nigerian Bar Association & Anor., the Supreme Court had struck down section 12(7) of the Legal Practitioners Act, which purported to provide a direct appeal from the LPDC to the Supreme Court. The Applicant was in a quagmire as there was no effective statutory appellate mechanism through which the he could challenge the Direction. Significantly, the Body of Benchers itself acknowledged that there was no statutory provision establishing an Appeal Committee competent to entertain such an appeal.

The Applicant therefore boldly approached the Federal High Court, not for a rehearing of the disciplinary proceedings or a substitution of the Court’s assessment for that of the LPDC, but principally to challenge the constitutional propriety of implementing the disciplinary sanction in circumstances where the statutory appellate avenue was unavailable.

The Federal High Court under Justice Egwuatu without wasting time came to a conclusion which its effect and dimension is still reverberating in the legal circle. What, in my respectful view, makes the decision particularly significant is the Court’s treatment of the doctrine of fair hearing.

Traditionally, fair hearing is understood in terms of the right to know the case against oneself, the opportunity to present one’s case, call evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and have the matter determined by an impartial adjudicating body.
Justice Egwuatu’s decision takes the principle into a further and important dimension.
The judgment suggests that where the law provides an appellate safeguard against an adverse determination, that safeguard must be real and capable of meaningful exercise. It cannot be reduced to a theoretical right where the decision sought to be challenged is immediately implemented in circumstances that effectively defeat the opportunity to appeal.
The Court’s reasoning, in the peculiar circumstances before it, was that section 36(2)(b) of the Constitution could not be interpreted in a manner that permitted a determination to become effectively final and conclusive when the legal framework contemplated appellate protection but provided no practical mechanism through which that protection could be exercised.

The Court captured the injustice which could result from the contrary position in remarkably vivid language, likening the situation to “beating a child and asking him not to cry.” The Court emphatically concluded: “That will not be justice. That will be injustice.”
The judgment also demonstrates the continuing relevance of the ancient principle ubi jus, ibi remedium, where there is a right, there must be a remedy.

The Court was nevertheless careful not to convert judicial review into an appeal on the merits. It recognised that the Applicant was not inviting the Court to reconsider the factual findings or substitute its own assessment for that of the LPDC.
The intervention was directed instead at the legality and constitutionality of implementing the Direction in circumstances in which the contemplated appellate protection was unavailable.
The Court consequently held that the Direction was amenable to judicial review and that its implementation, in the absence of an effective appellate mechanism, was inconsistent with sections 36(1), 36(2) and 6(6)(b) of the Constitution. It restrained implementation of the Direction until an appropriate appellate avenue was established.

In my respectful view, this decision has moved the conversation on fair hearing beyond the traditional question of whether a person was given an opportunity to be heard at first instance. It invites us to consider whether the entire adjudicatory process, including any constitutionally contemplated appellate protection, operates in a manner that gives practical meaning to the right. That is impacful!

For now, Justice Egwuatu’s decision has opened an important and intellectually stimulating conversation about the relationship between fair hearing, access to justice, appellate remedies and constitutional protection.
It is, in my respectful view, a bold decision and a significant contribution to Nigerian constitutional jurisprudence.

We are living in interesting legal times, and I am happy to be part of that generation.

Dr. M. O. Ubani, SAN
Legal Practitioner/Policy Analyst writes from Copenhagen, Denmark.