Emergency Rule in Nigeria: A Troubled Journey from 1962 to Tinubu
Emergency powers are designed to be constitutional safety valves for exceptional times of crisis. In Nigeria, however, their invocation has often been controversial, as leaders have sometimes used them to suspend democratic institutions. From the Western Region crisis of 1962 to President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s recent six-month intervention in Rivers State, the central question has remained constant: should emergencies be managed within the framework of democracy or through the temporary dismantling of elected structures to restore peace?
Nigeria’s first state of emergency came in May 1962, declared by Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa during the Action Group crisis in the Western Region. Violent clashes between supporters of Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Chief S.L. Akintola had paralysed governance.
Balewa suspended the Premier, cabinet, and legislature, and appointed Dr. Moses Majekodunmi as Administrator. His justification was clear: when the actors in government themselves became the source of disorder, removing them was the only way to restore peace.
This reasoning, that the democratic structures themselves can sometimes be the greatest threat to stability, would become a recurring theme in later emergency declarations.
During President Shehu Shagari’s administration (1979-1983), no state of emergency was formally proclaimed before the military coup of December 1983. Yet the precedent of 1962 still cast a long shadow, reinforcing the belief that when political officeholders themselves drive instability, their suspension is sometimes necessary for order.
President Olusegun Obasanjo revived emergency powers in the Fourth Republic.
Plateau State, 2004: Amid bloody ethno-religious violence, Obasanjo suspended Governor Joshua Dariye and the legislature, appointing General Chris Alli (rtd.) as administrator. He justified this on the grounds that the elected institutions had become too compromised to restore peace themselves.
Ekiti State, 2006: In the wake of impeachment disputes, Governor Ayo Fayose and the legislature were suspended, with General Tunji Olurin (rtd.) installed as sole administrator. Again, the reasoning was that the democratic institutions were too engulfed in the crisis to serve as neutral stabilisers.
Critics argue that these moves violated Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution, which empowers the President to declare an emergency but does not expressly authorise suspension of elected organs. Yet Obasanjo’s defenders maintained that leaving partisan actors in place amid chaos would only escalate violence.
President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua (2007-2010) chose a different route. Confronting the Niger Delta militancy, he avoided emergency rule and instead launched the 2009 Amnesty Programme. Here, he showed that crises could be resolved without suspending elected institutions, though even his advisers acknowledged that in some situations, if state leaders had been parties to the violence, suspension might have been unavoidable.
President Goodluck Jonathan declared emergencies in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States at the peak of Boko Haram’s insurgency. Crucially, however, he left the governors and state assemblies in place.
This was hailed as a constitutional milestone, showing that even in war-like conditions, democratic mandates could be preserved. Yet Jonathan’s critics pointed out the risks: by leaving governors in place who were often accused of complicity or incompetence, he arguably limited the effectiveness of the emergency response.
Thus, while Jonathan’s approach strengthened constitutional fidelity, others argued it might have slowed down decisive action against insurgency.
President Muhammadu Buhari (2015-2023) faced multiple security crises – Boko Haram, banditry, and separatist agitations, yet he never declared formal emergency rule. Instead, he deployed the military nationwide, avoiding the constitutional controversy of suspending structures.
But this raised another problem: a militarised society without parliamentary oversight, arguably less accountable than formal emergency rule itself.
The debate came to life again under President Bola Ahmed Tinubu. On March 18, 2025, he declared a state of emergency in Rivers State amid a fierce power struggle between Governor Siminalayi Fubara and the House of Assembly, accompanied by escalating violence and alleged attacks on oil infrastructure.
Tinubu suspended the Governor, Deputy, and legislature, and appointed Vice Admiral Ibok-Ete Ekwe Ibas (rtd.) as sole administrator. The National Assembly endorsed the move. Six months later, on September 17, 2025, the emergency was lifted and democratic institutions were restored.
Tinubu defended his action vigorously. He argued that the very custodians of democracy had become the greatest threat to peace and order in Rivers State. Leaving them in charge, he said, would have “eclipsed the state itself.” By temporarily removing them, he claimed to have saved the state’s vital assets and preserved the stability of the federation’s oil heartland.
Whether one agrees or not, Tinubu’s reasoning reflects the same logic as Balewa in 1962 and Obasanjo in 2004/2006: when government itself becomes the problem, the temporary dismantling of its actors may be the only path to peace.
Nigeria’s history of emergency rule thus reveals two contrasting traditions:
- The preservationist tradition (Jonathan, 2013) which is to confront crises while retaining elected institutions, thereby strengthening constitutionalism but risking slow or ineffective response.
- The interventionist tradition (1962, 2004, 2006, 2025): suspend elected structures temporarily to create neutral space for peace and security, risking democratic backsliding but sometimes preventing total collapse.
President Tinubu’s handling of the Rivers State crisis has revived this debate in sharp relief. By suspending elected officials, he repeated a constitutionally controversial pattern, yet his defenders argued that he prevented a looming collapse that could have endangered both Rivers and Nigeria’s oil economy.
The lesson is clear: emergency powers are blunt tools. They must be used with caution, subject to National Assembly oversight, and always followed by full restoration of democratic governance. If Tinubu’s argument holds, then his Rivers intervention may be remembered not as a democratic setback but as a case where the temporary removal of political actors saved the state in order to save democracy itself.
The Supreme Court of Nigeria may not revisit the constitutionality of the President’s action, as it appears for now to be an academic exercise. What President Bola Tinubu enjoys, however, is not judicial precedent but deep political precedent, stretching back to 1962!
M.O. Ubani, SAN, writes from Abuja as a keen observer of Nigeria’s political history.
